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RECENT DECISIONS
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TRADE MAR.Ks--AsslGNABILITY IN GRoss--Aft.er using the name "Mother
Parker" in connection with a biscuit mix manufactured in Brooklyn, plaintiff,
Heloise Parker Broeg, in 1934 opened a bakery in Boston under the name
"Mother Parker's Cupboard." She operated this store and another iri the same
area until I939, selling a line of bakery goods including bread, doughnuts, cakes,
and coo~es. In 1936 the trade mark "Mother Parker's" was registered in the
United States Patent Office. Plaintiff and her husband opened an experimental
laboratory and retail bakery in Peterboro, New Hampshire, in 1940 under the
name "Mother Parker's Cupboard" in which they manufactured a' complete
line of bakery products until December IO, 1941 when a fire destroyed the
bakery. Since that time, the plaintiff had not manufactured or sold bakery
products, although she had participated in a food broadcast daily under the
name "Mother Parker." Defendant, operator of a large bakery in New Bedford, Massachusetts, was licensed by the plaintiff to make exclusive use within
the territory he then served of the trade mark "Mother Parker's" during the
years from 1941 to 1943 inclusive. Under this license, defendant sold bread,
including one brand named "Mother Parker's Enriched Home Made," and,
under a similar license, defendant sold doughnuts during much of the same
period. After both licenses expired in December, 1943, and the parties faileq.
to agree on terms for their ren.ewal, defendant continued to use the name
"Mother Parker's" on his bakery products. Plaintiff brought suit to restrain
the use of the trade mark and to recover damages, and appealed from the action
of the trial court dismissing her bill. On appeal, held, affirmed. Plaintiff forfeited her right to relief in equity by lic.ensing the defendant's use of the trade
mark without assigning any part of her business, merchandise, good will, or
formulae. Broeg v. Duchaine, (Mass. 1946) 67 N.E. (2d) 466.
In stating its conclusion the court repeated the conventional, although misleading, definition of the function of a trade mark as identification of the origin
or ownership of the articl.e to which it is affixed.1 This definition overlooks the

1 Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 at 412, 36 S.Ct.
357 (1916): "The primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the
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dual function of a trade mark today, nai:n;ely, the creation and retention of custom.2 Under modern merchandising and distribution methods, the most that
can be said for a trade mark as an indication of ownership or origin is that it
indicates a commercial source which may be a manufacturer, jobber, retailer, or
importer. 3 Recognition of the fact that the commercial sourc_e is frequently
anonympus can be found in the cases 4 as well as in the statements of leading
writers. 5 A traditional statement in the decisions is that a trade mark can have
no existence in gross, unconnected with some business with which it is used; 6
and, ostensibly to protect th.e public from fraud, a trade mark is said not to be
assignable in gross. 7 While both of these propositions are supported by the cases,
origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed." NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE MARKS, 3d ed., §22 (1929).
2
See chapter summary in SCHECHTER, H1sTORICAL FoUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 171 (1925); also Grismore, "Assignment of Trade
Mark$," 30 M1cH. L. REv. 489 at 491 (1932).
In discussing the often-repeated doctrine that where there are no circumstances
that would cause the public to think the products bearing the same name were made
by the same party, no wrong is done, Mr. Schecht~r says the following: "This conclusion that 'no wrong is done' is based upon an archaic notion of the function oi a trademark as solely indicating 'source or origin.' It assumes that 'the elementary eq?itable
principle upon which the whole law of this subject is based ••• is that one may not
palm off his goods as the goods of another' and that the sole injury resulting from
the use of the same 'lion' mark on linen and iron might be a confusion as to the
source of these two dissimilar products. It ignores the fact that the Creation and
retention of custom, rather than the designation of source, is the primary purpose of
the trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of
the trademark is of paramount importance to its owner." Schechter, "The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 at 822 (1927).
3
See Isaacs, "Traffic in Trade Symbols," 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210 at 1220
(1931); Grismore, "Assignment of Trade Marks," 30 M1cH. L. REv. 489 at 494
(1932).
4
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Corm,ll Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1918) 250 F.
960 at 963: "The plaintiff has at least shown that the public has become accustomed
to regard its familiar wheat biscuit as emanating, if not from it by name, at least from
a single, though anonymous, maker, and the second is -.as good for these purposes as
the first."
5
Schechter, "The Ra~ional Basis of Trade Mark Protection," 40 H!l,RV. L. REV.
813 at 816 (1927): "It indicates, not that the article in question comes from a definite or particular source, the characteristics of which or the personalities connected
with which are specifically known to the consumer, but merely that the goods in connection with which it is used emanate from the same-possibly anonymous---source or
have reached the consumer through · the same channels as certain other goods that
have already given the consumer satisfaction, and that bore the same trademark."
6
Rodseth v. Northwestern Marble Works, 129 Minn. 472, 152 N.W. 885
(1915); N1Ms, UNFAIR CoMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS, 3d. ed., §188, p. 505
(1929): "A trade mark is auxiliary to the good will of its user ...• There is no such
thing as a trade mark in gross."
1
Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 6U at 620 (1879); Mayer Fertilizer & Junk Co.
v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 35 App. D.C. 425 (1910); Jackman v. CalvertDistillers Corp. of Mass., 306 Mass. 423, 28 N.E. (2d) 430 (1940); United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 46 S.Ct. 48 (1918).

RECENT DECISIONS

they do not provide a standard by which the often-complicated fact situations in
trade mark litigation can be solved. The Massachusetts Court recognized the
validity of the assignment of a trade mark on whiskey by a Canadian firm to a
New England firm when accompani.ed by the transfer of the good will of the
business of selling the Canadian firm's whiskey in New England at a time when
any legally-acquired good will which the trade mark may have had was developed in the nine months period between December of 1933 and September of
1934.8 On the other hand, a federal court decision, cited in the principal case,
held invalid an assignment of all right, title, and interest in a mark and in the
good will of the business in which it was used, apparently because the assignor
continued to produce the goods which had borne the mark "Radium" under
another name after the assignment.9 Many of the cases can be reconciled by
stating the outer limits of assignability as unreasonable restraint of trade or deceit
of the public as a consequence of the assignee's use.10 Either of these consequences of a transfer should render the assignment invalid. Even the religiouslycited case of Falk v. American West Indies Trading Company 11 seems to rest
on the likelihood that the assignee's use would deceive the public rather than on
the proposition that trade marks are not assignable in gross. The assignment of
good will, as it is understood today,1 2 with the trade mark should be sufficient
for validity so long as the public will not be misled as a result of the assigns "Since the contract between the plaintiff and the Columbia Company purported
to transfer the good will of the business of selling the Columbia Company's "Four
Aces" whiskey in New England in connection with the name "Four Aces," the assignment may be said to be a sufficient assignment and not an invalid assignment, in gross,
of the mark." California Wine and Liquor Corp. v. Wm. Zakon and Sons, Inc., 297
Mass. 373 at 378, 8 N.E. (2d) 812 (1937).
9
"But the statute contemplates that, whatever extensions of the trade-mark
through extensions of business may subsequently be legitimately acquired by the assignee,
he shall take over the good will of the business in which prior to assignment the trademark has been used." Eiseman v. Schiffer, (C.C. N.Y. 1907) 157 F. 473 at 476.
10
This theme is developed in Grismore, "Assignment of Trade Marks," 30 M1cH.
L. REV. 489 at 495 (1932) as follows: "Two limitations on the power to transfer
good will are clearly recognized. They are limitations that grow out of considerations
of public policy. These limitations are that the transferee will not be protected ( 1)
if an unreasonable restraint of trade results from the transfer, or (2) if the public will
be deceived as a consequence of it."
11
The following is the analysis presented in the Falk Case, 180 N.Y. 445 at 451,
73 N.E. 239 (1905): "There is no allegation, proof or fincling in this case that the
plaintiffs, upon the execution of the writing referred to or at any other time, succeeded
in any way to the business of the assignor or any part of it, or to the good will to
which up to that time the trade mark had been attached..•• Other examples might
be cited that would not come within the rule above suggested, but in the case at bar
the trade mark was originally adopted by the Lichtensteins to distinguish a cigar manufactured by themselves. The trade mark in their hands represented their own article,
their own skill and business experience. When used by the plaintiffs in their business
it does not truly denote anything of the kind and the plaintiffs' claim really is that
they have acquired the right to sell their own goods as the goods of someone else."
12
A statement of the relationship between a modern definition of good will and
rational trade mark decisions on assignability can be found in Grismore, "Assignment
of Trade Marks," 30 M1cH. L. REv. 489 at 492 et seq. (1932).
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ment. Neither reason nor the Trade Mark Act 13 require that tangible physical
assets be transferred for a valid assignment of good will, because good will often
exists independent of tangible property. The simp~e device of requiring the
assignee to indicate in connection with his use of the mark that he is the successor, not the originator, of the mark whenever the fact situation would otherwise be likely to result in deceiving the public should be sufficient protection for
the public int_erest.14 Under the analysis suggested, it appears that the principal
case is correctly decided, because the plaintiff did not purport to transfer the
good will of her business, and the defendant's initial use of the trade mark was
likely to mislead the public as to the commercial source of the goods.ia The
consequences, in permitting defendant's continued pr.esumably-deceptive use of
the mark are som,ewhat incongruous, although it would seem that since defendant has used the mark in question for six years, whatever good will the mark
has today is probably customer acceptance built by the defendant's use rather
than vestiges of the plaintiff's good will.
Joseph N. Morency, Jr.

13 33 Stat. L. 727, c. 592, §10·(1905), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §90, provides only
that a registered mark "shall be assignable in connection with the good will of the
business in which the mark is used."
14 This solution has received approval in recent years and is suggested as a solution to this aspect of the problem by Professor Grismore, "Assignment of Trade
Marks," 30 M1cH. L. REv. 489 at 497 (1932).
The proposition that there is no practical difference between trade marks· and
trade names is well argued by Handler and Pickett, "Trade Marks and Trade Names,"

30 CoL. L. REV. 168, 759 (1930).
15 Principal case at 468: "In these circumstances we think the plaintiff is in no
position to invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the defendant from further
using the ,trade mark. If the plaintiff has a valid trade mark in the name "Mother
Parker's," it is because the public has become accustomed to regard the bakery products sold under that name as having been made by her or, at least, as emanating from
a single source. When she permitted it to be used by the defendant in the circumstances here disclosed, she was enabling the defendant to palm off his goods as hers,
thereby deceiving the public. It has been held, and we think rightly, that where the
owner of a trade mark or trade name licenses another to use it in circumstances similar
to those here he cannot call upon a court of equity to protect it."

